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ASYLUM UNDER ATTACK: 
IS IT TIME FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT? 
Stephen Meilit 
"'We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country,' [Presi-
dent] Trump tweeted while on the way to his golf course in Virginia. 
'When somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or 
Court Cases, bring them back from where they came." 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past three years, the Trump Administration has proposed several 
changes in U.S. immigration policy that severely restrict the due process 
rights of asylum-seekers. They reflect the Administration's view that asy-
lum is a "loophole" around U.S. immigration law rather than a right based 
on both U.S. domestic and international law. Four of the more notorious 
such policies are "Zero Tolerance" which separated children from their par-
ents at the southern border with Mexico, "Turnback" which forces asylum-
seekers to lodge their asylum applications only at designated border stations 
and returns other asylum-seekers to Mexico without the opportunity to ap-
ply for asylum, the "Migrant Protection Protocols" which forces many asy-
lum-seekers to remain in Mexico while their applications for asylum in the 
United States are processed, and "Third Country" which forces asylum-
seekers to apply for asylum in certain countries through which t ey traveled 
on their way to the United States. 
Each of these policies has been challenged in federal court litigation. 
The majority of the claims in those lawsuits arise under the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act. While some in-
voke the Constitution, they are limited to either the due process rights ac-
corded to non-citizens generally or the substantive due process right to 
family integrity. What they do not assert is a constitutional right to seek 
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I received research assis-
tance for this article from University of Minnesota Law School students Sara 
Halimah'20 and Kimberly Medina '20. I also received logistical assistance from y 
Administrative Assistants Elizabeth Coffield and Lorena Anderson. I am grateful for 
comments I received on earlier drafts of this article from Michael Churgin, Heidi Ki-
trosser, Karen Musalo, and for the feedback I received at presentations sponsored by 
Brunel University in London and Universidad del Pacffico in Lima. 
1. NY Times June 24, 2019 , at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/us/politics/ 
trump-immigration-judges-due-process.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage 
&pgtype=article&region=footer. 
148 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
asylum derived from the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
which has been recognized in several Circuit Courts, rejected in others, and 
never adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. This omission begs the ques-
tion that this article addresses: Is it time for the Supreme Court to recognize 
a constitutional right to seek asylum? 
Such a right has been growing increasingly prevalent around the 
world. While only 11 percent of the world's nations had recognized such a 
right in 1951, by 2017 that percentage had grown to 35 per cent.2 The con-
stitutionalization of the right to seek asylum is part of a larger trend toward 
the constitutionalization of human rights law more generally.3 The national 
constitutions of most countries now feature a variety of human rights provi-
sions.4 As Wayne Sandholtz has observed, by the end of the 20th century, 
constitutionalization of human rights had become the norm around the 
world.5 
While the U.S. Constitution (particularly the Bill of Rights) includes a 
number of human rights provisions (most notably freedom of expression, 
association, and religion, as well as the right to due process and equal pro-
tection), it lags behind most countries in this area. This is not necessarily a 
pejorative critique. Indeed, one criticism of the expanded constitutionaliza-
tion of human rights law is that it is all words and no action. As Roberto 
Gargarella has observed in the context of Latin America (which has seen an 
exponential increase in constitutionalized human rights provisions in recent 
decades), such provisions are rendered virtually meaningless when they are 
not accompanied by other measures to address the organization of power 
within society. 6 The relative lack of human rights provisions in the U.S. 
Constitution has accorded particular strength to those which made their way 
into that document. 
2. Lucas Kowalczyk & Mila Versteeg, The Political Economy of the Constitu-
tional Right to Asylum, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1219 (2017). These provisions constitu-
tionalize the right to seek asylum, not to receive it. 
3. See Stephen Meili, ConstitutionalizedHuman Rights Law in Mexico: Hope for 
CentralAmerican Refugees? 32 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 103-145 (2019). 
4. See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT (February 9, 2019, 3:31 
PM), http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/Z5JY-PLR8]. 
5. Wayne Sandholtz, Treaties, Constitutions and Courts: The Critical Combina-
tion, in THE POLITICS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF LAW: GETTING FROM 
RIGHTS TO JUSTICE 31 (Alison Brysk ed., 2013). 
6. Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010: The Prob-
lem of the 'Engine Room' of the Constitution, in LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN 
AMERICA: TRANSFORMING COURTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND RIGHTS 213-16 
(Pedro Fortes et al. eds., 2017). 
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Given the gravity of the interests at stake for asylum-seekers, as well 
as the threat posed by the restrictive policies advanced by the Trump Ad-
ministration, it is time for serious re-consideration of the need for a consti-
tutionally recognized right to seek asylum. Such a right is not without 
precedent in the U.S. Indeed, several Circuit Courts have acknowledged 
that it resides within the constitutionally protected due process rights of 
non-citizens. However, the Supreme Court has ducked the issue, preferring 
to issue rulings on other grounds.7 The spate of litigation currently challeng-
ing various restrictions on the right to seek asylum provides the Court and 
the advocates who appear before it with a timely opportunity to address this 
issue head on. 
This article is divided into five parts. Part I reviews the literature on 
the constitutional right to asylum and the constitutionalization of human 
rights law more generally. Part II discusses the constitutional right to asy-
lum in the U.S., reviewing the Circuit Court jurisprudence on the subject. 
Part III reviews the litigation challenging the Trump Administration's Zero 
Tolerance, Turnback, Migrant Protection Protocols, and Third Country poli-
cies, with particular emphasis on the constitutional arguments asserted by 
the plaintiffs in those cases and any preliminary rulings by courts to date. 
Part IV argues that a right to asylum would provide a more constitutionally 
appropriate way for courts to adjudicate the claims of asylum-seekers who 
have been adversely affected by these policies. A conclusion follows. 
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE EVOLUTION, POTENTIAL, AND 
LIMITATIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM. 
As noted above, in 1950, only 11 per cent of the world's constitutions 
contained a right to seek asylum.8 In most of these cases, the right had been 
created in the immediate aftermath of World War II and was thus influ-
enced by two geopolitical factors: in some cases, such as France and Italy, it 
was included as a sign of the gratitude that those countries felt toward other 
states that had accepted French and Italian refugees before and during 
World War II.9 And in Soviet Bloc countries such as Poland, the right to 
seek asylum was conditioned on shared ideologies. 10 As Lucas Kowalczyk 
7. See e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
8. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 143-44. 
9. See H6lene Lambert et al., ComparativePerspectivesof ConstitutionalAsylum 
in France, Italy, and Germany: Requiescat in Pace?, 27 REFUGEE SURV. Q., 17-32 
(2008). 
10. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 1242. One example of such an ideo-
logically-framed constitutional right to asylum is contained in the 1952 version of the 
Polish Constitution: "The Polish People's Republic grants asylum to citizens of foreign 
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and Mila Versteeg note, political and economic self-interest, as opposed to 
humanitarian concern, drove many states to include a right to seek asylum 
in their constitution." These self-interested motivations included condemn-
ing foreign states, encouraging opposition groups in foreign states, at-
tracting a younger workforce, and announcing good intentions with little or 
no interest in actually following through.1 2 
By 2017, the percentage of countries with constitutions containing a 
right to seek asylum had risen to 35 per cent, with the greatest increase 
occurring during the 1990s.13 By this time, the nature of the constitutional 
right to seek asylum came to reflect the emphasis on human rights that had 
taken hold in many parts of the world in the intervening decades. As Ko-
walczyk and Versteeg note, most of these constitutional provisions (as well 
as updated provisions that were initially included in constitutions after 
World War II) frame asylum as a human right, rather than limiting it to 
those persons who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of one or more of the five grounds enumerated in the Refugee Con-
vention.14 Thus, under most of the constitutions within which the right to 
seek asylum appears, it is theoretically available to those non-citizens 
whose human rights have been violated by their countries of origin. In this 
way, the constitutionalized right to seek asylum mirrors what has come to 
be known as the human rights approach to asylum law, which links eligibil-
ity for asylum to the denial of human rights protections by one's home 
country or territory.1 5 Indeed, this broad view of the notion of asylum (i.e., 
countries persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, for fighting for 
social progress, for activity in defence of peace, for fighting for national liberation or 
for scientific activity." Constitution of the PolishPeople's Republic, July 22, 1952, art. 
75. Another example is the right to asylum in the Iranian Constitution, which states, in 
article 155, that "The Islamic Republic of Iran shall offer sanctuary to all those asking 
for political asylum, excepting those who are known, in accordance with the laws of 
Iran, to be traitors and criminals." Constitutionof the IslamicRepublic of Iran,Decem-
ber 2-3, 1979 art. 155. Kowalczyk and Versteeg also note the trend since the Cold War 
era away from limiting the right to asylum to persons whose ideologies were consistent 
with the host country. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 142-145. 
11. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 1250-57. 
12. Id. 
13. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 144. 
14. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 
6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter "Refugee Convention"]. Kowalczyk and Versteeg 
also note the trend since the Cold War era away from limiting the right to asylum to 
persons whose ideologies were consistent with the host country. Kowalczyk & Ver-
steeg, supra note 2, at 142-145. 
15. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 194 (2d ed. 2014). 
See also Deborah Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm,15 
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broader than the definition of a refugee under the Refugee Convention), is 
what Marfa-Teresa Gil-Bazo envisions in asserting that asylum is a general 
principle of international law. 16 
While international refugee law sets out the parameters for refugee sta-
tus, it does not compel individual states to grant asylum to anyone. Indeed, 
the Refugee Convention, the principle international instrument pertaining to 
refugees and asylum-seekers, is silent as to an individual right to asylum.17 
The decision to grant asylum, and the permanent immigration status to 
which it leads, is purely a matter of domestic law applied by sovereign 
states.18 In most cases, that domestic law is a statute that, at a minimum, 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 143 (2002) (finding that the human rights approach assists 
both the refugee law and human rights law regimes). The human rights approach 
manifests itself most prominently through domestic court interpretation of undefined 
terms in the Refugee Convention, such as "being persecuted." To proponents of this 
approach, it is appropriate-and logical-to rely on human rights treaties to inform the 
scope of "persecution" because these treaties reflect a global consensus about he scope 
of persecutory harms. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER at 194. 
16. Marfa-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Asylum as a General Principle of International Law, 
27 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 3, 3 (2015). 
17. One of the recommendations of the drafters (the Plenipotentiaries) of the Ref-
ugee Convention was that governments continue to receive refugees such that they may 
find asylum. However, this was not stated in terms of a right. See United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, July 25, 1951 "The Conference recom-
mends. . . that Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that 
they act in concert in a true spirit of international cooperation in order that these refu-
gees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement." In its Introductory Note as 
part of the 60-year anniversary of the Refugee Convention, the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees stated "Grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of human 
rights 1948, which recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in 
other countries, the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
adopted in 1951, is the centrepiece of international refugee protection today (emphasis 
added)." This may have been an attempt to make up for the lack of a definitive state-
ment of the right to seek asylum in the Refugee Convention. 
18. The only international instrument that contains a right to asylum is the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, which states at Article 14 (1): "Everyone has the right 
to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." UN General Assem-
bly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A(III). The 
United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Territorial Asylum states the excep-
tions to the right to asylum, without explicitly declaring that such a right exists: "The 
right to seek and to enjoy asylum may not be invoked by any person with respect to 
whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a crime against 
peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instru-
ments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes." UN General Assembly, 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum art. 1(2), Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14 De-
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incorporates the definition of a refugee from the Refugee Convention and 
the principle of non-refoulement.19 In this way, domestic law transforms the 
non-binding standards of international refugee law into a pathway to perma-
nent protection. 
For the most part, however, those domestic statutes do not create a 
right to either apply for or receive asylum; they merely set forth an adminis-
trative procedure through which someone fleeing persecution or other harm 
can apply for protection. In addition, of course, such statutes can be 
amended to make the process of applying for asylum both more logistically 
difficult and the standards for granting asylum more restrictive. 20 
cember 1967, A/RES/2312(XXII). Several regional human rights instruments contain a 
right to seek asylum, including the American Convention on Human Rights, at Article 
22 (7) ("Every person has the right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, 
in accordance with the legislation of the state and international conventions, in the event 
he is being pursued for political offenses or related common crimes), Organization of 
American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", 
Costa Rica, 22 November 1969; the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, at 
Article 12 (3) ("Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and 
obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with laws of those countries and Interna-
tional conventions"), Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charteron Human 
and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
I.L.M. 58 (1982); and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, at Article 18 ("The 
right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Con-
vention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of 
refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union"), European Union, CharterofFundamentalRights 
of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02. 
19. Gil-Bazo, supra note 16, at 39-40. Non-refoulement prohibits a country from 
returning a non-citizen to a territory where she is likely to face torture or cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment. Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, 
THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, (3d ed. 2007); James C. Hathaway, 
THE RIGHTS OF REFUGGES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). The INA 
incorporates the principle of non-refoulement in a form of relief known as withholding 
of removal, which prohibits the return of a non-citizen to a country where it is more 
likely than not that their life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See INA 
§ 241 (b)(3)(B). 
20. Exemplifying this possibility, President Trump has indicated that the current 
crisis facing asylum-seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border could be eradicated quickly if 
Democrats in Congress would simply change the nation's immigration laws. See Franco 
Ordofez & Bobby Allyn, Trump Delays Immigration Raids, Giving Democrats 'Two 
Weeks' To Change Asylum Laws, NPR, June 22, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/06/22/ 
735083190/trump-delays-immigration-raids-giving-democrats-two-weeks-to-reform-
asylum-laws?t=1562163148237. 
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Constitutions, and the rights they afford, are more durable than stat-
utes. While they are certainly not set in stone, their provisions are generally 
more impervious to regime changes and political whims than statutes. As 
Kowalczyk and Versteeg have stated, "where a right to asylum is constitu-
tionalized, states effectively restrict their ability to make their response to 
refugees dependent on prevailing political sentiments. "21 And, as noted 
above, Gil-Bazo argues that the right to asylum enshrined in national con-
stitutions is broader than refugee status under the Refugee Convention (and 
other international instruments) thus affording broader protection to those 
fleeing persecution and other forms of harm in their states of origin.22 
The durability and breadth of a right to seek asylum in a national con-
stitution is particularly important in today's geopolitical climate of national-
ism, xenophobia and anti-globalization. At a time when many states scorn 
international constraints on their behavior and question their obligation to 
protect refugees, statutory asylum law would seem to be particularly vulner-
able. 23 Ignoring - or altering - the rights of asylum-seekers embedded in a 
national constitution presents more of a challenge, particularly in a country 
with a strong, independent judiciary. 24 
In addition, the constitutional right to seek asylum has the potential to 
assume a more meaningful role because of the increasingly apparent limita-
tions of the Refugee Convention, which has for decades been the main 
source of protection for the world's refugees. These failings include, but are 
certainly not limited to, desperately underfunded humanitarian assistance 
programs, nearly universal disregard for the socioeconomic rights of refu-
gees protected under international law, and inadequate and inconsistent ref-
ugee determination processes in various countries. 25 As a result, the 
21. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 143-44. 
22. See Gil-Bazo, supra note 16. 
23. Refugees have traditionally been among the most politically marginalized and 
powerless groups in any society. See Brysk, The Future of Human Rights (2018). 
24. An independent judiciary is consistently cited as one of the factors associated 
with improved human rights behavior by states. See, e.g., Sandholtz, supra note 5. 
25. Alexander Betts & Paul Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee Sys-
tem 7-8 (2017). The authors note that contrary to popular belief, most refugees around 
the world live in urban areas rather than in camps, in the Middle East and sub-Saharan 
Africa rather than in Europe, and are often left unsupported by their host countries. Id. 
Under the Refugee Convention, refugees are entitled to the right to health care, educa-
tion, employment, and other socioeconomic benefits, but these often go unfulfilled. The 
Refugee Convention was limited both temporally and geographically, applying only to 
refugees who had been displaced by World War II. United Nations General Assembly, 
FinalAct of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Status of Refu-
gees and Stateless Persons, art. I(A)(2). July 25, 1951. It was seen as a temporary 
measure to deal with that particular refugee crisis. 
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world's refugees lack most of the legal, social, and economic guarantees to 
which they are entitled under international law. 
Despite this potential, the constitutional right to asylum suffers from 
significant limitations. For example, Kowalczyk and Versteeg observe that 
constitutions can be amended and that judges can defer to executive will. 26 
H6lene Lambert et. al. argue that because countries such as France, Ger-
many and Italy have chosen to adjudicate asylum claims almost exclusively 
according to the Refugee Convention, constitutional asylum in those coun-
tries has become virtually meaningless. 27 In a similar vein, Gil-Bazo notes 
that because many countries have blurred the distinction between refugee 
status and asylum, constitional asylum has come to be viewed as obsolete.28 
In addition, most states include an "escape clause" in their constitu-
tionalized right to asylum, indicating that such a right will be interpreted 
according to national law. 29 Given that such laws can be more restrictive 
than the protections afforded by the Refugee Convention, a constitutional 
right to seek asylum will be of little use.30 Moreover, in some situations 
constitutional asylum is based on the same (limited) criteria as in the Refu-
gee Convention.31 
Subsequent geopolitical events, such as the decolonization movement in Africa 
and the refugee migrations resulting from it, made it obvious that the world's refugee 
problem was neither temporary nor confined to Europe. Deborah Anker, LAW OF 
ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 n.1 (2014 ed.) (explaining the context of the 
creation of the Protocol). Hence, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1967 
Protocol") removed the temporal and geographic restrictions from the Refugee Conven-
tion. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6233, 660 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. 
26. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 133. 
27. Lambert, supra note 9, at 16, 17. 
28. Gil-Bazo, supra note 16, at 4. 
29. My thanks to my University of Minnesota colleague Chris Roberts for this 
term. For example, the Constitution of Portugal states, in relevant part: "The status of 
political refugees shall be defined by law." Constitution of the PortugeseRepublic [Por-
tugal] art. 22, 25 April 1976. Similarly, the Constitution of Poland states, in relevant 
part "Foreigners shall have a right of asylum in the Republic of Poland in accordance 
with principles specified by statute." Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Apr. 2, 
1997, art. 56. 
30. On the other hand, in some states, including Mexico, any "escape clause" that 
is inconsistent with Mexico's obligations under international human rights law would 
be nullified. 
31. For example, the Constitution of Hungary states, in relevant part, "Hungary 
shall grant asylum to all non-Hungarian citizens as requested if they are being perse-
cuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution in their native countries or in the 
countries of their usual residence due to their racial or national identities, affiliation to a 
particular social group, or to their religious or political persuasions, unless they receive 
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A constitutional right to asylum in some national contexts also suffers 
from the same source of ineffectiveness as other constitutionalized human 
rights: it is mere window dressing rather than a meaningful attempt to im-
prove human rights outcomes for marginalized groups. States have many 
motivations for taking on human rights obligations that they have little in-
tention of fulfilling. Much scholarly research has focused on the effective-
ness (and lack thereof) of constitutionalized human rights law in 
particular. 32 The results of this research - much of it large-N analyses of 
statistically significant relationships between treaty ratification and state be-
havior according to various benchmarks - is mixed.33 
If endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, a constitutional right 
to seek asylum (through the Due Process clause) would benefit from most 
of the advantages identified above, and few of the burdens. For example, 
while it would not be part of an actual amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
it would benefit from the durability of Supreme Court precedent linking the 
right to seek asylum with the Constitutional right to due process accorded to 
non-citizens. Such durability is particularly important at a time when U.S. 
policy towards asylum-seekers has become increasingly motivated by na-
tionalistic influences within the U.S. government and society generally. 
Moreover, Supreme Court jurisprudence over time demonstrates that the 
U.S. takes its Constitutional responsibilities seriously. While the executive 
and legislative branches of government sometimes resist fulfilling those re-
sponsibilities, an independent judiciary and active civil society have held 
them accountable under the Constitution.34 Few would deem the U.S. Con-
stitution mere window dressing. In short, and unlike in many other coun-
tries, a constitutionalized right to seek asylum in the United States would 
have real clout. 
protection from their countries of origin or any other country." The FundamentalLaw 
of Hungary, 18 April 2011, art. 65. 
32. For a general discussion of this literature, see Stephen Meili "The Effective-
ness of an Emerging Pathway of Rights: the Constitutionalization of Human 
Rights Law", in CONTESTING HUMAN RIGHTS: PATHWAYS OF CHANGE, Ali-
son Brysk et al., eds. (2019). 
33. One such study found a statistically significant association between the consti-
tutionalization of two organizational rights (the rights to form political parties and un-
ions) and improved human rights behavior by states, but no such association with four 
individual rights ((the rights to freedom of expression, association, religion and move-
ment). See Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Do ConstitutionalRights Make a Differ-
ence?, 60 AM. J. OF POL. Sci. 575 (2016). One treaty protection that has been 
consistently shown not to be associated with improved state behavior is the prohibition 
against torture. See Meili (in Brysk) supra note 32. 
34. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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The next part of this article analyzes the current state of a right to seek 
asylum in U.S. jurisprudence. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The question at the heart of this article lies at the intersection of two 
conflicting views of the Constitutional rights of non-citizens more gener-
ally. On the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that non-
citizens enjoy due process protections under the 5th and 14th Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution.35 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held 
that admission to the United States is a privilege, and that there is no consti-
tutional right regarding the application to enter.36 The distinction between 
these perspectives has, in most cases, depended on whether the non-citizen 
was already within the United States (and thus entitled to the due process 
rights accorded to all "persons" under the 5th and 14th Amendments) or 
was seeking entry into the U.S., either for the first time or after having left 
and was seeking to return.37 Most asylum-seekers have actually been in the 
U.S. for some time: they are individuals whose legally procured visas have 
expired. 38 They are clearly entitled to the due process protections of the 
Constitution, which include a hearing on their asylum claim. The due pro-
cess rights of asylum-seekers at the border are less clear cut. On the one 
35. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding protections under the 
14th Amendment applied to "all persons," textually, and so in reality must apply to all 
persons within the jurisdiction of the U.S. and do not depend on citizenship status); 
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding the provisions of the Fifth 
Amendment applied to 'aliens' as well as citizens); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 
(1976) (affirming the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment do protect the millions of 
"aliens" within the jurisdiction of the U.S., including Due Process.). 
36. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (noting that "the power to ex-
clude or admit aliens is a sovereign prerogative"); see also United States ex rel. Knauff 
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 
651, 659-660 (1892). 
37. Landon, supra note 36. In this case, the Supreme Court held that non-citizens 
facing deportation after having been present in the country were entitled to greater due 
process protections that those who were seeking admission to the U.S. for the first time. 
Id. at 32-37. The issue presented in Landon was the degree of process due to a lawful 
permanent resident who had left the country for a relatively short period of time before 
seeking re-entry. 
38. Individuals who overstay their visas outnumber asylum-seekers at the U.S. 
southern border by more than two-to-one. Krishnadev Calamur, The Real IllegalImmi-
gration Crisis Isn'ton the Southern Border, ATLANTIC, April 19, 2019, https://www.the 
atlantic. com/international/archive/2019/04/real-immigration-crisis-people-overstaying-
their-visas/587485/. 
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hand, they are seeking admission to the country and, according to Supreme 
Court, that "privilege" carries with it no constitutional guarantees.39 On the 
other, they are seeking to enter the U.S. via a procedure guaranteed through 
statutory law that, at least according to some Circuit Courts, carries with it a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest. It is to that legislative and consti-
tutional basis for seeking asylum that we now turn. 
The statutory basis for seeking asylum in the U.S. is section 208 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), which states in relevant part: 
Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who ar-
rives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of 
arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States 
after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), 
irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum ... 40 
The standard for granting asylum in the U.S. became part of the INA 
with passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which incorporated into the INA 
the definition of "refugee" from the 1951 Refugee Convention. 41 Thus, in 
order to establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that 
he or she will be persecuted on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.42 
Soon after passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, several Circuit Courts 
began to consider whether the right to asylum had roots in the U.S. Consti-
tution, as well. 43 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the ques-
tion of whether there is a constitutionally protected right to petition for 
asylum in Jean v. Nelson in 1985 but chose to determine the case on statu-
tory grounds.44 Jean (1985) was appealed to the Supreme Court from the 
Eleventh Circuit, where the appeals court rejected the argument that non-
citizens seeking admission had any constitutional rights. Because the Su-
preme Court did not approve or reject this holding, Circuit Courts have 
been left to determine the law for themselves. 
39. See Landon, supra note 36. 
40. 8 U.S.C. §1158 (a)(1). (The grounds for asylum in the United States mirror 
those set forth in the Refugee Convention: a well-founded fear of persecution based on 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). 
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(i); Refugee Convention, Article 1. 
41. Refugee Convention, supra note 14. 
42. I.N.A. § 101 (a)(42). 
43. Id. 
44. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). Jean was a class action on behalf of 
Haitians that challenged a change by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service 
("INS") from a policy of general parole for undocumented non-citizens seeking admis-
sion to the U.S. to a policy, based on no statute or regulation, of detention without 
parole for non-citizens unable to present a prima facie case for admission. 
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A. Developing CircuitLaw on the ConstitutionalRight to Asylum 
In her 2000 article "The Due Process Right To Seek Asylum in the 
United States: The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy," 
Kendall Coffey analyzed the Circuit decisions which had addressed this 
question to that point. 45 This section of this article reviews those decisions 
and key developments in this area since Coffey's article was published. 
1. The Fifth Circuit was the first to find a constitutional right to 
asylum, with several circuits following suit. 
The foremost case holding that there is a constitutionally protected 
right to petition for asylum in the United States is from the Fifth Circuit. In 
Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, the Circuit Court ruled that significant 
flaws in INS processing of asylum applications resulting in mass denials for 
relief violated constitutional due process on grounds that petitioning for 
asylum is constitutionally protected.46 The Court articulated two bases for 
its ruling: (1) constitutional protections, including due process, apply to all 
persons within U.S. borders regardless of citizenship, and (2) the applicable 
INS regulation and U.S. treaty commitments established a constitutionally 
protected right to petition the government for asylum.47 
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that even though Congress enjoys broad 
powers over immigration, including the ability to exclude non-citizens alto-
gether, the executive is subject to the constraints of due process in imple-
menting congressional policy precisely because due process applies to all 
persons within the jurisdiction of the U.S., regardless of their immigration 
status. 48 According to the Court, there is a separate source of liberty interest 
based on state and federal laws that creates a "substantive entitlement to a 
particular governmental benefit." 49 Based on Congressional immigration 
law and agency regulation, the Court held that non-citizens had been 
granted a right to submit and substantiate their claim for asylum. From this, 
the Court applied the Supreme Court's due process doctrine to hold that the 
Constitution protected the right to seek asylum. 50 
45. Kendall Coffey, The Due ProcessRight To Seek Asylum in the United States: 
The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 
303 (2000). 
46. HaitianRefugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1036-39 (5th Cir. 1982). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added). 
49. Id. 
50. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
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Essentially, because federal statutory law (i.e., the INA) established a 
right to petition for asylum, it concomitantly established an entitlement giv-
ing rise to a liberty interest protected under the Constitution. As such, be-
cause the right to seek asylum had its roots in procedural due process, the 
Fifth Circuit held that "some form of a hearing" was required before that 
interest could be deprived, and that the hearing must be held in a meaning-
ful time and manner. 51 In a passage particularly relevant to the limits on 
access to asylum instituted by the Trump Administration, the Fifth Circuit 
held that "the government violates the fundamental fairness which is the 
essence of due process when it creates a right to petition and then makes the 
exercise of that right utterly impossible."5 2 
The Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit soon followed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's lead on this question. In Augustin v. Sava, the petitioner challenged 
defects in the translation of asylum proceedings as violating the right to 
receive a fair asylum hearing. 53 The Second Circuit held the lack of ade-
quate translation of asylum proceedings violated the procedural due process 
rights of asylum applicants. 54 The Court reasoned that because the Refugee 
Act of 1980 had created a substantive entitlement to seek asylum, the right 
to apply for asylum and receive a fair hearing required adequate procedural 
safeguards. 
In Maldonado-Perezv. INS, the D.C. Circuit Court followed the Fifth 
Circuit's analysis to recognize a procedural due process right to petition for 
asylum. 55 The Court found that due process protections applied to a peti-
tioner who had entered without inspection and been deported in absentia.56 
Though due process did not create a right to be granted asylum, "the mini-
mal procedural due process in this contest requires only a meaningful or fair 
evidentiary hearing with reasonable opportunity to be present." 57 
Indeed, even the Eleventh Circuit, which in 1984 had rejected the no-
tion of a constitutional right to asylum in Jean, has since changed its view. 
In Jean, the Eleventh Circuit had held that there was no constitutional duty 
to notify non-citizens of their asylum rights and held that courts should 
51. HaitanRefugee Ctr., 676 F.2d at 1039-40. 
52. Id. at 1039. The relevant discussion in HaitianRefugee Center concerned the 
due process protection applied to the act of seeking asylum, not to the granting of asy-
lum relief itself, which is discretionary under the INA. 
53. Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32 (2nd Cir. 1984). 
54. Id. at 36-37. 
55. Maldonaldo-Perezv. Immigr. and NaturalizationServ.,865 F.2d 328 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989). 
56. Id. at 331-33. 
57. Id. at 333. 
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defer to the INS on issues of detention and release. 58 Importantly, the Court 
opposed constitutional due process for all 'excludable aliens,' stating 
"aliens seeking admission ... have no constitutional rights with regard to 
their applications and must be content to accept whatever statutory rights 
and privileges they are granted by Congress." 59 The Court continued to ex-
plicitly disavow the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Haitian Refugee Center, 
stating "the grant of asylum does not . . . create an interest protected by the 
due process clause." 60 
However, in 2007, in the case of Marin v. U.S. Attorney General, the 
Eleventh Circuit shifted course and held that (1) the Fifth Amendment enti-
tles non-citizens to due process of law, (2) non-citizens do have a protected 
interest in petitioning for asylum, separate from receiving relief which is 
discretionary, and (3) due process can only be satisfied by a full and fair 
hearing. 61 In 2008, in Mendez v. U.S. Attorney. General, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit again cited Haitian Refugee Center in stating that "aliens do have a 
protected interest in petitioning for asylum," thus foreclosing and dis-
missing the Government's arguments in the case at hand.62 
The Court's shift in reasoning was a mixture of evolving doctrine and 
circuit court restructuring. As to the former, in Qiang Wang v. U.S. Attorney 
General, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "Congress and the executive have 
created, at a minimum, a constitutionally protected right to petition our gov-
ernment for political asylum."6 3 And as to the latter, the Court acknowl-
edged that it is "bound [by] decisions issued by Unit B of the former Fifth 
Circuit," as required under its own Circuit law." 
2. Some Circuits fall somewhere in between expressly adopting the 
Fifth Circuit precedent and expressly denying it. 
In her 2000 article, Coffey described the Third Circuit's position on 
this question as one offering a middle ground. In Marincas v. Lewis, the 
Court held that INS regulations were legally inadequate for stowaway asy-
lum-seekers because they differed from those applied to other asylum-seek-
58. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d. 957 (1985). 
59. Id. at 968. 
60. Id. at 981-82. 
61. Marin v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 35 F. App'x 719, 724 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Hai-
tian Refugee Ctr., 676 F.2d at 1038) (citations omitted). 
62. Mendez v. U.S. Atty. Gen, 285 F. App'x 685, 687 (11th Cir. 2008). 
63. Wen Qiang Wang v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 395 F. App'x 670, 672-73 (11th Cir. 
2010) (citing HaitianRefugee Ctr., 676 F.2d at 1038). 
64. Id. at 673 n. 3, citing Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th 
Cir.1982). HaitianRefugee Ctr. was decided by Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit. 
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ers.65 The Third Circuit held, however, that they were not entitled to 
Constitutional protection in seeking admission, and instead relied on gen-
eral due process Supreme Court cases to support its holding.66 According to 
Coffey, the Court ruled on statutory grounds, thus avoiding a Constitutional 
question. 67 
Since then, the Third Circuit has continued to forge a middle ground. 
For example, the opinion in Mudric v. Attorney General of U.S. seems at 
first to follow Jean (1984) and the original Eleventh Circuit position, but 
then states: 
"While an alien may be eligible for a grant of asylum or an adjust-
ment of status under the immigration laws, he is not entitled to such 
benefits as a constitutional matter. There is no constitutional right to 
asylum per se. An alien seeking admission to the United States 
through asylum "requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights 
regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is 
a sovereign prerogative." 68 
However, in this passage the Court seems to be discussing the grant of 
asylum, as opposed to the constitutional right to petition for asylum. 
This view is supported by the Third Circuit's language in Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, where the Court states: 
"Despite the fact that there is no constitutional right to asylum, aliens 
facing removal are entitled to due process..... The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner. .. . In adjudicative contexts 
such as this one, due process requires three things. An alien: (1) is 
entitled to fact finding based on a record produced before the deci-
sion maker and disclosed to him or her; (2) must be allowed to make 
arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to an indi-
vidualized determination of his [or her] interests." 69 
However, the Third Circuit has also ruled that "although the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process . . . in deportation proceedings, 
due process is flexible," and calls for such protections as the situation de-
mands. 70 The due process "afforded aliens stems from those statutory rights 
65. Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996). 
66. Coffey, supra note 45, at 323. 
67. Id. 
68. Mudric v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2006). 
69. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3rd Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
70. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
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granted by Congress and the principle that 'minimum due process rights 
attach to statutory rights.'"71 
The Eighth Circuit has not expressly disavowed the reasoning in Hai-
tian Refugee Center. In Minwalla v. LN.S., the Eighth Circuit rejected the 
argument that failure to notify a non-citizen of her statutory right to apply 
for asylum violates due process because of the factual circumstances of the 
case, not because the Court found any issue with the legal basis of the argu-
ment.72 The Court merely analyzed the petitioner's argument "assuming 
that due process entitles an alien to notice of his right to apply for asy-
lum."7 3 While this is not an express adoption, neither is it an express 
rejection. 
3. Some Circuits expressly reject a constitutional right to asylum. 
In Selgeka v. Carroll,the Fourth Circuit held that "aliens have no inde-
pendent constitutional rights in an asylum procedure."7 4 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court held that non-citizens only have those rights Congress 
sees fit to provide, and that assuming Congress intends immigration proce-
dures to be fair, minimum due process rights attach to statutory rights 
provided.75 
The First Circuit has echoed the Eleventh Circuit's position in Jean. In 
Amanullah v. Nelson, the Court cites Jean for the proposition that "aliens 
seeking admission to the United States therefore have no constitutional 
rights with regard to their applications and must be content to accept 
whatever statutory rights and privileges they are granted by Congress."7 6 
In summary, three Circuits (the Fifth, Second and DC) recognize a 
right to seek asylum under constitutional due process guarantees. Two (the 
Fourth and First) reject such a right. Still others have either taken a middle 
ground (the Third and Eighth) or not addressed the issue. This Circuit split 
has now endured for several decades without resolution by the U.S. Su-
preme Court. 
Of course, the existence of a procedural due process right to seek asy-
lum is only the first question in this inquiry. The second question (assuming 
71. Id. at 238, quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 2003). 
72. Minwalla v. LN.S., 706 F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1983). 
73. Id. 
74. Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 1999). 
75. Id.; see also Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 
2004) (also stating non-citizens have only those rights Congress sees fit to provide, e.g. 
non-citizens do not have a constitutional right to an administrative appeal). 
76. Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Jean v. Nelson, 727 
F.2d at 968). 
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the answer to the first is "yes") is what process is due? The Supreme Court, 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, enumerated the factors which must be considered 
in determining whether a particular process is constitutionally satisfactory: 
1. The private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
2. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub-
stitute procedural safeguards; and 
3. The Government's interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail. 7 
As the Supreme Court held in Landon v. Plasencia, a non-citizen's 
interest in remaining in the U.S. is "weighty". 78 However, the interest of an 
asylum-seeker in remaining in the U.S. is even weightier, given the perse-
cution that she has alleged she is fleeing from. Moreover, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of that interest through inadequate procedures may be 
extremely high, depending on the severity of those inadequacies. As the 
Supreme Court has held, the inquiry into the process due in any given situa-
tion is analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Part IV of this article will examine 
each of the Trump Administration restrictions on access to asylum accord-
ing to the criteria outlined above. 79 
B. Why This Matters Now More Than Ever 
The Circuit split on the constitutional right to seek asylum has become 
more important given the recent (and likely ongoing) increase in challenges 
to the limits that the Trump Administration has placed on the right of asy-
lum-seekers. The recognition of such a right by the U.S. Supreme Court 
would give clear direction to the lower courts as to how to resolve these 
challenges. Indeed, the lack of such a right appears to have affected the 
presentation of the challenges to the procedures, which are primarily based 
on procedural flaws under the APA and violations of the statutory opportu-
nity to apply for asylum. The next two sections of this article catalogue 
those challenges, and suggests ways that they would be strengthened under 
a constitutional right to seek asylum. 
77. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (internal citations and quo-
tations omitted). 
78. Landon, supra note 36, at 330. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
non-citizen, who was a lawful permanent resident seeking to re-enter the country after a 
visit to Mexico, stood to "lose the right 'to stay and live and work in this land of 
freedom'". Id. (citations omitted). 
79. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). ("(D)ue process is flexi-
ble and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."). 
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III. RECENT LITIGATION CHALLENGING U.S. LIMITATIONS ON 
ACCESS TO CLAIMING ASYLUM. 
In the past three years, the Trump Administration has initiated a series 
of proposals that constitute an unprecedented attack on the right to seek 
asylum in the United States. These include limitations on who can file asy-
lum applications, where they can be filed (both nationally and extraterritori-
ally), and where applicants must reside outside the U.S. while those claims 
are being decided. It has also sought to limit the scope of asylum to exclude 
persons fleeing domestic violence in their home countries and who are fam-
ily members of those threatened with violence and other forms of persecu-
tion. And in perhaps its most sweeping move to date, in July 2019 the 
Administration proposed denying access to the U.S. asylum process to any-
one who passed through certain designated countries on their way to the 
United States. 80 
This section of this article examines the litigation over four of those 
policies, and the extent to which a broadly recognized Constitutional right 
to asylum would clarify the issues and provide asylum-seekers with the 
protections to which they are entitled under both international and domestic 
law. 
A. The Zero Tolerance Policy 
On April 6, 2018, the Trump Administration announced its "Zero Tol-
erance" policy as a means of discouraging undocumented persons from mi-
grating into the United States and to reduce the burden of processing 
asylum claims that Administration officials contend are often fraudulent. 81 
Under the Zero Tolerance policy, the Department of Justice prosecuted all 
adult non-citizens apprehended crossing the border illegally, with no excep-
tion for asylum-seekers or those with minor children.82 DOJ's policy repre-
80. Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Most Migrants at Border With 
Mexico Would Be Denied Asylum Protections Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/us/politics/trump-asylum-
rule.html. 
81. Congressional Research Service, The Trump Administration's "Zero Toler-
ance" ImmigrationEnforcement Policy, Updated February 26, 2019, available at https:/ 
/fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45266.pdf. In reality, the Trump Administration had been 
separating families since July 2017. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction, in Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. and 
Customs Enforcement, No. 18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD (S.D.Cal. 2018), issued on Janu-
ary 13, 2020, at 6. 
82. SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE 
TIME OF TRUMP 108 (2019). 
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sented a change in the level of enforcement of an existing statute rather than 
a change in statute or regulation. Prior Administrations prosecuted illegal 
border crossings relatively infrequently. 83 Because there are limitations on 
the detention of children, the incarceration of adults apprehended as part of 
the Zero Tolerance policy resulted in the separation of children from their 
parents that led to widespread public outcry.84 
The challenge to Zero Tolerance was initially brought by an individual 
parent ("Ms. L") who had been separated from her child. A class of plain-
tiffs filed an amended complaint after Ms. L. had been reunited with her 
child. The class action complaint asserted that Zero Tolerance violates both 
substantive and procedural due process, though none of these due process 
arguments references a right to petition for asylum.8 5 The substantive due 
process claim was based on the right to family integrity that the U.S. Su-
preme Court has recognized in other contexts, and the procedural due pro-
cess claim was based on the lack of a hearing before parents were separated 
from their children. The plaintiffs also claimed that Zero Tolerance served 
no legitimate purpose or compelling state interest. 86 Although the complaint 
also alleges that Zero Tolerance violates the plaintiffs' opportunity to apply 
83. Congressional Research Service, supra note 81. 
84. Deborah Barfield Berry & Alan Gomez, Tiny Shoes, Caged Children: Pro-
testing Trump Administration 'Zero Tolerance'Immigration Policy, USA TODAY, May 
7, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/05/07/migrant-family-sep-
aration-under-zero-tolerance-protested-activists-immigration-policy/1132932001/. Esti-
mates of the number of children separated from their parents vary. One such estimate 
claims that as many as 6,022 family units could have been separated between April 19, 
2018 and August 15, 2018. See Amnesty International, USA: Catastrophic Immigration 
Policies Resulted in More Family Separations than Previously Disclosed (October 11, 
2018), https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/usa-catastrophic-immigration-policies-re-
sulted-in-more-family-separations-than-previously-disclosed/. Moreover, at least 1,712 
children may have been separated from their parents before the policy's implementa-
tion. Jacob Soboroff and Julia Ainsley, Trump AdministrationIdentifies at Least 1,700 
Additional Children it May Have Separated, NBC NEws (May 18, 2019), https:// 
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/1-700-additional-separated-migrant-children-identi-
fied-trump-administration-n1007426. A report issued by the Inspector General for the 
Department Health and Human Services on September 4, 2019 listed anxiety, depres-
sion, anger, guilt, acute grief, and PTSD among the mental health issues exhibited by 
children who had been separated from their parents. See Joanne M. Chiedi, Care Pro-
vider FacilitiesDescribed ChallengesAddressing Mental HealthNeeds of Children in 
HHS Custody (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), http://cdn.cnn.com/ 
cnn/2019/images/09/03/oei-09-18-00431_mentalhealthreport.pdf. 
85. Amended Complaint at 9, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enforcement, 
No. 18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD (S.D.Cal. 2018). 
86. Id. 
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for asylum, it couches this as a statutory violation (i.e., of the INA), rather 
than a constitutional due process violation.8 7 
In its decision granting a Preliminary Injunction, the Southern District 
of California concluded that the family separation policy itself, and the way 
it was implemented, was sufficient to meet the "shocks the conscience" 
standard necessary for the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim to pro-
ceed.88 Yet, as noted above, that due process claim (and its vindication by 
the District Court) was rooted in the substantive due process right to family 
integrity, rather than a procedural due process right to seek asylum. 89 
87. Id. at 11-12. The Complaint alleges that Zero Tolerance violates 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158, which outlines the procedure for applying for asylum. 
88. Ms. L. v. Immigr. and Customs Enforcement, 310 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1142-1146 
(S.D.Cal. 2018). The District Court focused on the policy's separation of parents and 
children without any inquiry into whether the parents were unfit to care for their chil-
dren and without any procedure for allowing communication between parents and their 
children or later reuniting children with their parents. Id. at 1142. The court thus went 
on to conclude that, "[a] practice of this sort implemented in this way is likely to be so 
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary con-
science, interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty[,] and is so 
'brutal' and 'offensive' that it [does] not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and 
decency." Id. at 1145-1146 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
89. Id. at 1142 ("Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the Government's practice of sep-
arating class members from their children, and failing to reunite those parents who have 
been separated, without a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to 
the child violates the parents' substantive due process rights to family integrity under 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution."). The Ms. L. litigation is ongo-
ing, but it now concerns the circumstances under which families previously separated 
under the Zero Tolerance policy will be reunited, rather than any due process right to 
seek asylum. Two additional lawsuits have challenged the Zero Tolerance policy, 
though they focused more on the reunification of separated families rather than a due 
process right to apply for asylum. See Dora v. Sessions, Case No. 1:18-cv-01938 
(D.C.D.C. 2018) (filed on behalf of parents seeking reunification with their children) 
and M.M.M. v. Sessions, Case No. 18cv1832 (S.D. CA 2018) (filed on behalf of chil-
dren seeking reunification with their parents). Dorawas voluntarily dismissed in Febru-
ary 2019. See U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL 
DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:18-cv-01938-PLF, available at https:// 
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-DC-0065-9000.pdf. The District Court 
granted class certification and approved the settlement of MMM in November 2018. See 
Order Certifying the Settlement Classes and Granting Final Approval of Class Action 
Settlement, dated November 15, 2018 (available at https://www.courtlistener.com/re-
cap/gov.uscourts.casd.585969/gov.uscourts.casd.585969.99.0.pdf. MMM is ongoing, 
though it now concerns enforcement of the settlement agreement, rather than the adjudi-
cation of substantive issues. 
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B. The Turnback Policy 
In November 2018 the Trump Administration issued an Interim Final 
Rule (IFR) as well as a Presidential Proclamation (No. 9822), barring asy-
lum-seekers who enter the US between designated ports of entry from seek-
ing asylum. This policy, known as "Turnback" was the culmination of a 
long series of less formalized policy initiatives undertaken by the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (and more specifically Customs and Border Pa-
trol) to restrict access to the U.S. asylum system. According to the plaintiffs 
who sued the government over the policy, these actions included turning 
away asylum-seekers by falsely informing them that the U.S. is no longer 
providing asylum, that President Trump signed a new law ending asylum, 
that a law providing asylum to Central Americans ended, that Mexican citi-
zens are not eligible for asylum, and that he U.S. is no longer granting 
asylum to mothers with children. 90 CBP officials also allegedly intimidated 
asylum-seekers by threatening to take away their children if they do not 
renounce a claim for asylum and by threatening to deport asylum-seekers. 91 
The Trump Administration justified the Turnback policy on several 
grounds, perhaps the most striking of which was then-Secretary Nielsen's 
charge that non-citizens are using the asylum system as a "loophole" to get 
around U.S. immigration law.92 Similarly, then-Attorney General Sessions 
claimed that asylum-seekers are attempting to undermine our laws and 
overwhelm our system." 93 Indeed, the Turnback policy was a response to 
what Sessions had earlier described as a process through which "dirty im-
migration lawyers" would tell their otherwise inadmissible clients to claim 
90. Order at 8, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC 
(S.D.Cal. 2019). 
91. Id. Other alleged tactics by CBP include compelling asylum-seekers to sign 
forms recanting previous statements of fear of persecution in English without transla-
tion, instructing some asylum-seekers to recant their fears of persecution while being 
recorded, turning asylum-seekers away from points of entry ("POEs") without any sub-
stantive explanation, physically blocking access to POEs, imposing a fixed number of 
asylum-seekers per day and placing asylum-seekers on a waiting list that results in 
asylum-seekers waiting for extended periods of time on or near bridges leadings to 
POEs in rain, cold, and heat, without sufficient food or water and with limited bathroom 
access, and racially discriminatory denials of access by CBP officers, including by de-
nying asylum-seekers from specific countries access to POEs and allowing lighter-
skinned individuals to pass. Id. at 8-9. 
92. See Lawsuit Challenges Trump Administration's Turnback Policy Against 
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a credible fear in order to initiate the asylum process and thus stave off 
removal. 94 Like Zero Tolerance, the Turnback Policy has had demonstrable 
effects: As of late September 2019, approximately 26,000 asylum-seekers 
were waiting in Mexican border towns in overcrowded shelters and danger-
ous conditions. 95 
The Turnback policy has been challenged in several lawsuits. One, ti-
tled East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, was heard in the Northern 
District of California. 96 Two others, O.A. v. Trump and S.M.S.R. v. Trump, 
were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 97 Another, filed 
after some of the claims in East Bay were rendered moot, is Al Otro Lado, 
Inc. v. McAleenan98 
For purposes of this article, the claims in these cases were virtually 
identical, with one important exception. All alleged that the Turnback pol-
icy violated the INA and the APA. With respect to the first of these claims, 
they alleged that forcing asylum-seekers to enter the U.S. at designated 
ports of entry violates Section 1158 of the INA, which provides asylum-
seekers with the opportunity to file asylum applications regardless of where 
they enter the U.S.99 And they alleged that the policy violates the APA 
because it is contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and was promulgated 
without the proper notice and comment. 100 The complaints in East Bay and 
A.O., however, were silent as to a constitutional right to seek asylum, even 
though the plaintiffs alleged that the result of the Turnback policy denied 
94. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SES-
SIONS DELIVERS REMARKS TO THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 
(2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-re-
marks-executive-office-immigration-review ("We also have dirty immigration lawyers 
who are encouraging their otherwise unlawfully present clients to make false claims of 
asylum providing them with the magic words needed to trigger the credible fear 
process."). 
95. Daniella Silva, Advocates Seek Motion to Block U.S. from Applying "Asylum 
Ban" to Some Migrants, NBC NEWS, September 26, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/latino/advocates-seek-motion-block-u-s-applying-asylum-ban-some-n 1059161. 
96. EastBay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F.Supp.3d 838 (N.D.Cal. 2018). 
97. O.A. v. Trump, 404 F.Supp.3d 109 (D.D.C. 2019); S.M.S.R. v. Trump, 1:18-cv-
02838-RDM ( D.D.C. ). In December 2018 these cases were consolidated, with O.A. 
becoming the lead case. University of Michigan Law School, Civil Rights Litigation 
Clearinghouse, Case Profile, S.M.S.R. v. Trump (May 21, 2019), available at https:// 
www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17043. 
98. Al Otra Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, F.Supp.3d 1168 (S.D.Cal. 2019). 
99. See Complaint at 1, East Bay Covenant Sanctuary v. Trump, No. 3:18-cv-
06810 (S.D.Cal. 2018). 
100. Id. at 16-17. 
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access to the asylum process. 101 That denial of access was achieved by Bor-
der Patrol officials turning back asylum-seekers at the U.S. border, often 
under the false pretext that the government lacked the resources to ade-
quately process asylum claims.1 0 2 
In February 2020, in the East Bay litigation, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
the nationwide injunction against the Turnback policy that had been previ-
ously issued by the District Court. Its decision was based on the plaintiffs' 
arguments under the INA and the APA. Not surprisingly, it says nothing 
about a constitutional right to seek asylum.10 3 
Similarly, in an Order dated August 2, 2019 in the O.A. litigation, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Rule is unlawful for 
lack of compliance with the APA (the Attorney General and DHS Secretary 
exceeded the authority conferred on them by Congress) and therefore, did 
not reach Plaintiffs' substantive and procedural challenges. 104 
The complaint in Otro Lado did assert constitutional due process 
claims, and in its decision dated July 29, 2019, the District Court denied the 
government's motion to dismiss those claims. First, it held that the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies extraterritorially, such as when 
non-citizens encounter U.S. Border Patrol agents at the border. 105 Second, it 
101. See Order, supra note 90, at 2. The omission of a claim based on the right to 
seek asylum is particularly noteworthy in the O.A. v. Trump litigation, given that the 
D.C. Circuit has recognized such a right in the past. See Maldonado-Perezv. Immigr. 
and NaturalizationServ., 865 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Such an omission is perhaps 
more understandable in the East Bay litigation, given that the Ninth Circuit has not 
recognized a constitutional right to seek asylum. The complaint in S.M.S.R. v. Trump 
does allege a due process violation of the statutory right to seek asylum, but, as noted 
above, S.M.S.R. was consolidated with O.A., with O.A. becoming the lead case. See 
supra note 97. 
102. Id. at 3. 
103. With respect to the INA, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had 
correctly concluded that the Rule is not "in accordance with law," as it bans migrants 
who use a method of entry explicitly authorized by Congress from seeking asylum. See 
Order in EastBay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump (9th Cir., February 28, 2020) at 38-39, 
available at https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/02/28/18-17274.pdf. 
With respect to the APA, the Ninth Circuit held that the rule is arbitrary and capricious 
because it conditions asylum eligibility on the way that the asylum-seeker enters the 
country, a factor that has long been understood as worth little, if any weight, in deter-
mining whether an applicant should be granted asylum. Id., at 42. 
104. See O.A., supra note 97. 
105. Order, Al Otro Lado, Inc., supra note 90, at 70-76. The government had 
argued that he Fifth Amendment's protections for non-citizens do not extend beyond 
the U.S. border, and were thus inapplicable to situations where potential asylum-seekers 
were turned away before entering the U.S. (e.g., on bridges between Mexico and the 
U.S.). In this part of its opinion, the district court noted that the executive branch cannot 
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held that the plaintiffs had stated adequate due process claims because they 
alleged that government officials had denied them procedural protections 
that Congress had "plainly established." 106 In a decision issued on March 5, 
2020, the Ninth Circuit denied the Trump Administration's Motion for a 
Stay of the District Court opinion, lifting an emergency temporary stay that 
it had earlier issued pending its decision on the merits.107 Therefore, the 
District Court order remains in effect. 
C. "MigrantProtectionProtocols" (MPP) 
In January 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued 
the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), which initiated a new inspection 
policy along the southern border. Before the MPP, immigration officers 
would typically process asylum applicants who lack valid entry documenta-
tion for expedited removal. If the applicant passed a credible fear screening, 
DHS would either detain or parole the individual until her asylum claim 
could be heard before an immigration judge. The MPP now directs the "re-
turn" of asylum applicants who arrive from Mexico as a substitute to the 
traditional options of detention and parole. Under the MPP, these applicants 
are processed for standard removal proceedings, instead of expedited re-
moval. They are then made to wait in Mexico until an immigration judge 
resolves their asylum claims. 
As of February 2020, over 60,000 asylum-seekers (many of whom are 
from Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Venezuela) have been 
forced to wait in Mexico under the MPP. 108 The wait for a hearing can take 
turn the Constitution on and off at will, quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767 
(2008). 
106. Order, Al Otro Lado, Inc., supra note 90, at 77. ("Here ... Congress has 
plainly established procedural protections for aliens like the New Individual Plaintiffs in 
this case, who allege that they were in the process of arriving to the United States and 
expressed an intent to seek asylum. The New Individual Plaintiffs have plausibly al-
leged that immigration officers failed to discharge their mandatory duties under the 
relevant provisions. Consequently, the Court concludes that the New Individual Plain-
tiffs have stated procedural process claims and the Court denies Defendants' motion to 
dismiss these claims."). 
107. See American Immigration Council, et a., "Federal Court's Preliminary In-




108. Vanessa Romo, FederalCourtSuspends Injunction On Trump's 'Remain In 
Mexico' Program, NPR (Feb. 28, 2020, 4:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/28/ 
810440516/federal-court-again-blocks-trumps-remain-in-mexico-program; Maria 
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months, and applicants must travel across the border for each hearing by 
buses provided by DHS. 109 Covid-19 has exacerbated the problem, as the 
Trump Administration has postponed MPP hearings due to the epidemic.110 
Approximately 4,600 MPP hearings have been postponed, nearly half of 
which are for persons who had already been waiting in Mexico for six 
months. 11  In the meantime, asylum-seekers are left to languish in Mex-
ico.1 1 2 They face "insurmountable odds" to find shelter, employment, and 
safety.113 Vulnerable migrants are particularly impacted: young children 
cannot go to school, and often contract illnesses from the makeshift camps 
or suffer from lack of medication for diseases they already have; families 
separated by the U.S. southern border are often trapped in terrible situations 
trying to reunite with family in the U.S.114 
Sacchetti, Kevin Sieff, and Nick Miroff, Federal appeals court blocks President 
Trump's 'Remain in Mexico' policy but stays its own ruling, The Washington Post (Feb. 
28, 2020, 11:55 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-remain-in-
mexico-halted-federal-court/2020/02/28/87bbf85e-e481-11e9-b403-f738899982d2_ 
story.html. https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrfordersfromabove.pdf. 
109. According to one recently published empirical study of those forced to re-
main in Mexico under the MPP, the average wait for a hearing on asylum claims is 88.6 
days, with a maximum of 245 days. See Tom K. Wong, SEEKING ASYLUM: PART 2, 13 
(2019), https://usipc.ucsd.edu/publications/usipc-seeking-asylum-part-2-final.pdf. 
110. Adam Shaw, DOJpostpones 'Remain in Mexico' hearings in response to 
coronavirus threat, Fox NEWS (March 26, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/ 
doj -remain-in-mexico-hearings-coronavirus. 
111. Cat Cardenas, Still FearingViolence, MigrantsSubject to Trump's Remain in 
Mexico Policy Are Now Bracingfor a Pandemic, TEXAS MONTHLY (April 10, 2020), 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/news/matamoros-migrant-camps-coronavirus-remain-
mexico/. 
112. Stacy Caplow and Maryellen Fullerton, Migrant 'Protection'Protocols: A 
Reportfrom the FrontLines, LEXIsNEXIs: LEGAL NEWS Room, Sept. 10, 2019, https:// 
www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/outsidenews/posts/migrant-protec-
tion-protocols-a-report-from-the-front-lines. 
113. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, "Farceof Due Process":Lawyers Denounce New 
Border Tent Courts for Migrants, CBS NEWS, Sept. 19, 2019, https:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/asylum-seeker-tent-courts-at-border-denounced-by-attorneys-
as-farce-of-due-process/; Camilo Montoya-Galvez, U.S. says asylum seekers encoun-
tered along entire southern border can now be returned to Mexico, CBS NEWS, Sept. 
27, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/remain-in -mexico-u-s-says-it-can-now-re-
turn-asylum-seekers-to-mexico-along-entire-southern-border/; Caplow & Fullerton, 
supra note 112. 
114. Montoya-Galvez, supra note 113, (Sept. 27, 2019). See also Jonathan Blitzer, 
How the U.S. Asylum System Is Keeping Migrants at Risk in Mexico, NEW YORKER, 
Oct. 1, 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-the-us-asylum-system-is-
keeping-migrants-at-risk-in-mexico. 
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The vast majority of asylum-seekers forced to remain in Mexico under 
the MPP expressed a fear of return to that country when they were inter-
viewed by U.S. officials at the border." 5 Ignoring that fear violates both 
longstanding U.S. policy and the principle of non-refoulement, which many 
scholars contend has achieved the status of customary international law.1 16 
MPP is also plagued by severe limitations on the due process rights of 
asylum-seekers. For example, many asylum-seekers waiting in Mexico 
have presented their cases in court without counsel.1 7 This is due to several 
factors: U.S.-based attorneys attempting to represent asylum-seekers re-
turned to Mexico face a dangerous journey and risk being arrested for prac-
ticing law in Mexico without a license. 118 Moreover, given the physical 
danger in many of the places where asylum-seekers are forced to remain, 
many have chosen to accelerate their hearings rather than seek continuances 
to find attorneys. 119 
Beyond limitations on the right to seek counsel, the facilities con-
structed by the Trump Administration to consider asylum applications are 
woefully inadequate. These "tent courts" feature collective hearings where 
dozens of asylum-seekers are given notice and read their rights by the judge 
in a single announcement. 120 Interpretations are inadequate and the opportu-
nity to meet with counsel is very limited. 121 
The Trump Administration justified the MPP with the now familiar 
trope of an "invasion" of undocumented immigrants who are exploiting the 
asylum-system in order to gain unlawful entry into the United States. Ac-
cording to then-DHS Secretary Nielsen, "Aliens trying to game the system 
to get into our country illegally will no longer be able to disappear into the 
United States, where many skip their court dates." 122 Within a few months 
115. Wong, supra note 109, at 4. 
116. Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International 
Law 20 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 373-390 (2008). 
117. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S THIRD-COUNTRY TRANSIT 
BAR IS ANOTHER ASYLUM BAN (2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/ 
files/Third-Country-Transit-Ban.pdf. 
118. Montoya-Galvez, supra note 113, (Sept. 19, 2019) ("The Trump Administra-
tion failed to secure any guarantees from Mexico about whether U.S.-licensed lawyers 
would require work visas to visit clients in person or might face sanctions for the unli-
censed practice of law in Mexico. Indeed, U.S.-based attorneys have reported that Mex-
ican government officials have threatened to arrest American lawyers for practicing law 
in Mexico without a license."). 
119. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 117. 
120. Montoya-Galvez, supra note 113, (Sept. 19, 2019). 
121. Id. 
122. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SECRETARY 
KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN ANNOUNCES HISTORIC ACTION TO CONFRONT ILLEGAL IMMIGRA-
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of the announcement of the MPP, the White House issued a "Fact Sheet" 
which included a heading entitled "The Asylum Loophole". The subsequent 
text reads: "Migrants are flooding to our border to use asylum to gain entry 
into our country and remain here indefinitely. "123 
As of this writing, two lawsuits have been filed in response to the 
MPP. The first of these, Innovation Lab v. Nielsen, was filed in the North-
ern District of California shortly after the program was implemented. 124 The 
allegations in the complaint included the following: 
- The MPP deprived asylum-seekers of a meaningful opportunity to 
seek asylum by forcing them to return to Mexico, which has re-
cord levels of violence, to wait while their proceedings continue; 
" The Government's new procedure to determine who is returned 
cannot ensure that those who face persecution, death, or torture in 
Mexico would not be erroneously returned; 
- The MPP violated the INA and the APA. For example, INA 
§ 235(b)(2), which allows removal to contiguous foreign territory 
pending removal proceedings is not applicable to asylum-seekers. 
Moreover, INA § 241(b) prohibits removal to a country were one 
could face persecution. And the Government failed to comply 
with notice and comment, and the policy is arbitrary, capricious, 
and contrary to law; 
- Mexico lacks a functioning asylum system, and asylum-seekers 
face a significant risk of being involuntarily returned to their 
home countries. Beyond this, conditions in Mexico make it almost 
impossible for asylum-seekers to meaningfully exercise their ight 
to asylum; and 
" DHS erred in adopting "unprecedented" policy without the notice 
and comment required by the APA. 
On April 8, 2019, The District Court held that the MPP violated both 
the INA and the APA, and issued a nationwide injunction against its imple-
mentation. In the course of its decision, the Court held that the plaintiffs 
had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims (that 
DHS was not statutorily authorized to impose contiguous territory return for 
those subject o expedited removal proceedings; that DHS implemented the 
TION (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/12/20/secretary-nielsen-announces-his-
toric-action-confront-illegal-immigration. 
123. THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP IS WORKING TO STOP THE 
ABUSE OF OUR ASYLUM SYSTEM AND ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE BORDER 
CRISIS (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-
trump-working-stop-abuse-asylum-system-address-root-causes-border-crisis/. 
124. See Complaint in Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, No. 3:19-cv-00807 (N. D. 
Cal. 2019). 
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policy without concern for the legal obligation to avoid refoulement; and 
that DHS implemented the policy without the requisite notice and com-
ment). The District Court also found that Plaintiffs would likely suffer ir-
reparable harm by being subjected to violence in Mexico in the absence of a 
preliminary injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest 
favored such a preliminary injunction. 12 5 
The U.S. government appealed, and in a decision issued on February 
28, 2020 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's order.126 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the MPP violates the INA because (1) the INA pro-
hibits returning an asylum-seeker to a contiguous country to await a hear-
ing, and (2) the MPP is inconsistent with U.S. non-refoulement treaty 
obligations that were incorporated into the INA as part of the Refugee Act 
of 1980.127 Shortly thereafter, the government sought a stay from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which granted it, declaring the "district court's April 8, 
2019 order granting a preliminary injunction is stayed pending the timely 
filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari." 1 28 The govern-
ment quickly filed its petition for a writ of certiorari. 12 9 
The second case regarding the MPP is Doe v. McAleenan, which was 
filed in the Southern District of California in November 2019. Unlike Inno-
vation Lab, it does not challenge the MPP per se, but rather the lack of 
access to counsel for asylum-seekers during the so-called non-refoulement 
interviews conducted by DHS in order to determine whether those asylum-
seekers have a fear of persecution upon being deported to Mexico to await 
the processing of their asylum claims. 130 The plaintiffs in Doe assert proce-
dural and substantive due process claims (as well as claims under the INA, 
125. Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1121-1130 (N.D. Cal. 
2019). 
126. Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Cir-
cuit had earlier stayed the District Court order. See Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 
924 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 2019). 
127. Id. Following this decision, the government filed an emergency motion for 
stay pending disposition of petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. On March 4, 
2020 the Ninth Circuit denied the government's motion for such a stay but held that a 
stay of the injunction was warranted "insofar as it operates outside the geographical 
boundaries of the Ninth Circuit." Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986, 990 (9th 
Cir. 2020). 
128. Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, No. 19A960, 2020 WL 1161432, at *1 (U.S. 
Mar. 11, 2020). 
129. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chad Wolf, Acting Secretary of Home-
land Security, et al. v. Innovation Law Lab, et al., (No. 19-1212) (filed April 14, 2020). 
130. See Complaint in Doe v. McAleenan, 3:19-cv-02119-DMS-AGS (S. D. Cal. 
2019), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-CA-0152-
0001 .pdf. 
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APA and the First Amendment), but they concern access to counsel and the 
right not to be housed under conditions of confinement that amount to pun-
ishment, rather than a constitutional right to seek asylum. 131The District 
Court granted a temporary restraining order with respect to the plaintiffs' 
APA claims in November 2019, enjoining the government from denying 
plaintiffs access to counsel before and during their on-refoulement inter-
views. 13 2 The government's appeal is pending as of this writing. 
For purposes of this article, neither the complaints nor the subsequent 
court rulings in either Innovation Lab or Doe discuss whether the MPP 
violates the due process right to seek asylum. 133 In the meantime, tens of 
thousands of individuals seeking asylum in the U.S. wait in Mexico. 134 
D. "Safe" Third Country 
On July 16, 2019, the Attorney General and Acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security promulgated an interim final rule providing that non-
131. Id. 
132. See Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order in Doe v. 
McAleenan, dated November 12, 2019, available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/ 
chDocs/public/IM-CA-0152-0004.pdf. 
133. One potential bar to such an argument is INA § 1252 (b)(9), which signifi-
cantly limits the judicial review of removal proceedings. The MPP concerns the treat-
ment of non-citizens in removal proceedings (either expedited removal proceedings or 
regular removal proceedings). As the First Circuit has noted, § 1252 (b)(9) is "breath-
taking" in scope and "vise-like" in grip and therefore swallows up virtually all claims 
that are tied to removal proceedings. See Aguilar v. Immigr. and Customs Enforcement, 
510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007). According to the Ninth Circuit, "taken together, 
§ 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) mean that any issue-whether legal or factual-arising 
from any removal-related activity can be reviewed only through the PFR process." 
JEFM v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) See also Viloria v. Lynch, 808 
F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2015) ("It is well established that this court's jurisdiction over 
removal proceedings is limited to review of final orders of removal."). Nevertheless, 
when challenging executive action under the imprimatur of substantive due process, 
"the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egre-
gious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." 
City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). One could certainly assert that 
the MPP shocks the conscience and is thus a means of avoiding the "vise-like grip" of 
§ 1252 (b)(9). 
134. Jason Kao and Denise Lu, How Trump's PoliciesAre Leaving Thousands of 
Asylum Seekers Waiting in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, August 18, 2019, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/18/us/mexico-immigration-asylum.html. See 
also, Robert Moore, In Juarez, 'Remain in Mexico' Policy Casts Asylum-Seekers Back 
Into Uncertainty, NPR, July 10, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/07/10/740159720/ 
under-trump-policy-migrants-seeking-asylum-must-wait-in-mexico. 
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citizens who transit through another country prior to reaching the southern 
border of the United States are ineligible for asylum in the U.S. The Rule 
has only three narrow exceptions, for those who applied for protection in a 
transit country and were denied it in a final judgment; who meet the defini-
tion of a "victim of severe form of trafficking in persons"; or who transited 
only through countries that are not parties to the Refugee Convention or the 
Convention Against Torture. Mexico, the only country adjoining the south-
ern border of the United States, is a party to the Refugee Convention and 
the Convention Against Torture. 
In furtherance of this policy, the United States has reached tentative 
agreements with all three countries constituting Central America's so-called 
Northern Triangle. The first such agreement was with the then-Guatemalan 
President Jimmy Morales on July 26, 2019 as a result of economic pres-
sure. 135 Originally, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court blocked the agree-
ment from being implemented, arguing such a decision required the 
knowledge and approval of the Guatemalan Congress. 136 Since then, the 
agreement has been signed into law. 13 7 In November 2019, the Trump Ad-
ministration began sending asylum-seekers to Guatemala under the terms of 
this agreement.138 
The Trump Administration reached a similar third country agreement 
with El Salvador on September 20, 2019.139 The United States stated its 
135. Sofia Mechu, Guatemalan CourtHalts 'Safe Third Country' Designation for 
Asylum Seekers, REUTERS, July 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immi-
gration-guatemala/guatemalan-court-halts-safe-third-country-designation-for-asylum-
seekers-idUSKCN1UA1TK. See Associated Press, US to sign agreement o send asy-
lum seekers to El Salvador, GUARDIAN, Sept. 20, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/ 
us-news/2019/sep/20/us-el-salvador-asylum-seekers-deal-immigration ("US threatened 
to withhold all federal assistance to three Central American countries unless they did 
more to end the migrant crisis."); Mica Rosenberg, Honduras to Accept More Asylum 
Seekers under Latest U.S. Immigration Deal, REUTERS, Sept. 25, 2019, https:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration/honduras-to-accept-more-asylum-seekers-
under-latest-us-immigration-deal-idUSKBN1WA2QI. 
136. Sofia Mechu, supra note 135. 
137. Jos6 Garcfa Escobar and Kevin Sieff, Guatemala'sNext PresidentLikely to 
Face Pressurefrom Trump over 'Safe Third Country' Agreement, WASHINGTON POST, 
Aug. 9, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/theamericas/guatemalas-next-
president-to-face-trump-pressure-for-safe-third-country-asylum-agreement/2019/08/08/ 
a0414d48-b9e8-1 e9-8e83-4e6687e99814_story.html. 
138. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, U.S. Begins Deporting Migrants to Guatemala 
underAsylum Deal, CBS NEWS, Nov. 22, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/guate-
mala-asylum-deal-us-begins-deporting-asylum-seekers-to-guatemala-under-new-deal/. 
139. Nick Miroff, Trump AdministrationReaches Dealto Send Asylum Seekers to 
El Salvadorin an Effort to Deter Migrantsfrom Entering the United States, WASHING-
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promise to invest in El Salvador in return for El Salvador's agreement to 
take in "extraregional migrants," i.e., those from outside Central 
America. 140 Few details have been provided regarding specifics, such as 
4how the arrangement will work or when it goes into effect. 1 1 White House 
officials termed this agreement with El Salvador an "asylum cooperation 
agreement ("ACA")," possibly because of the backlash at using the term 
"safe third country agreement" for one of the most dangerous countries in 
the world.14 2 
The United States announced it had reached a 'third country agree-
ment' with Honduras on September 25, 2019.143 DHS and Honduran gov-
ernment officials, led by President Juan Orlando Hernindez, reached an 




140. Nicole Narea, Trump's Agreements in CentralAmerica Could Dismantle the 
Asylum System as We Know It, Vox, Sept. 26, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/9/26/ 
20870768/trump-agreement-honduras-guatemala-el-salvador-explained; Michelle 
Hackman & Juan Montes, U.S. Asylum Pact With Honduras Cements Trump Adminis-
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/20/762948556/u-s-el-salvador-sign-new-asylum-deal-to-stem-tide-of-migrants. 
142. Miroff, supra note 139; Gonzalez, supra note 141 ("A 2018 State Depart-
ment report on human rights in El Salvador cites allegations of unlawful killings and 
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report describes a 'lack of government respect for judicial independence' and 'wide-
spread government corruption."'); Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Elisabeth Malkin, U.S. 
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("Tens of thousands of Salvadorans have been displaced from their homes, and the 
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sought asylum worldwide, ranking the country sixth in the world for new asylum-seek-
ers. In addition, according to a government study supported by the United Nations high 
commissioner for refugees, at least 71,500 Salvadorans have been internally displaced 
by violence. Overall, about 150,000 Salvadorans have become refugees or sought asy-
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143. Nick Miroff, U.S. Announces Asylum Deal with Honduras, Could Send Mi-
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agreement that allows the United States to take asylum-seekers at its bor-
ders and "return" them to Honduras to seek asylum there, a country with 
intense gang wars and one of the highest murder rates in the world. 144 
Again, the United States threatened the Honduran government with eco-
nomic harm.14 5 The agreement came at a time when President Hernandez 
had been named as a co-conspirator in a major U.S. drug trafficking case. 14 6 
Mexico, on the other hand, has refused to enter in a third country 
agreement with the U.S.147 Mexico argues that it has already made the ma-
jority of changes and concessions discussed with the U.S. government. In 
June 2019, the Trump administration threatened to impose tariffs on Mexi-
can goods if Mexico did not join the effort to decrease the number of mi-
grants traveling to the U.S. southern border.148 Mexico assented, and since 
then has greatly increased its military presence and managed to show re-
duced migration and a decrease in numbers of border arrests. 149 
According to the complaint challenging the Safe third Country policy, 
it bars virtually every non-citizen fleeing persecution from obtaining asy-
lum in the United States if they passed through another country on their 
way there, no matter the conditions or purpose of their journey through that 
country or their prospect of protection, rights, or permanent legal status in 
that country.150 It would mean that virtually all asylum-seekers from the 
Northern Triangle of Central America would be prohibited from applying 
for asylum in the United States.151 
144. Id. 
145. See Associated Press, supra note 135 ("US threatened to withhold all federal 
assistance to three Central American countries unless they did more to end the migrant 
crisis"). 
146. Miroff, supra note 139. 
147. Daina Beth Solomon, Mexico Again Rejects 'Safe Third Country' Proposal 
by U.S. on Migration, REUTERS, Aug. 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-mexico-decison/mexico-again-rejects-safe-third-country-proposal-by-us-
on-migration-idUSKCN1VD02S. See also Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Mexico Writes off 
"Safe Third Country" Deal with U.S., Citing Drop in Border Crossings, CBS NEWS, 
Sept. 10, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mexico-writes-off-safe-third-country-
deal-with-us-citing-drop-in-border-crossings/. 
148. Narea, supra note 140. 
149. Id. 
150. See Complaint at 2-3, East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, No. 3:19-cv-
04073 (N. D. Cal. 2019). 
151. See id. It would also bar asylum applicants from other countries who transit 
through the Northern Triangle on their way to the United States and, ultimately, the 
United States. Indeed, many asylum-seekers from sub-Saharan Africa first travel to 
South America before heading north through Central America and Mexico on their way 
to the U.S. 
2 
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The policy would result in a number of harms. For example, if forced 
to apply for asylum in a third country, particularly in Mexico or the North-
ern Triangle of Mexico, asylum-seekers would face high homicide rates and 
broad security risks, including kidnapping, rape, assaults, and extortion.15 
Moreover, forcing thousands of asylum-seekers to first apply in a third 
country is likely to overwhelm underdeveloped asylum systems in these 
countries. As a result, asylum-seekers will not receive a full and fair pro-
cess.15 3 In addition, asylum-seekers who request asylum at the U.S. south-
ern border will be barred from asylum, which means that their only sources 
of protection in the U.S. will be withholding of removal or the Convention 
against Torture, neither of which allow for protection of family members or 
permanent refuge. As a result, enduring family separation will be far more 
likely for those who manage to obtain such relief 154 
In November 2019 the Trump Administration began a phase-in of the 
Safe Third Country policy by sending a Honduran man to Guatemala from 
the U.S. - Mexico border. 15  Under this phase-in, following initial screen-
ings by border Patrol agents and USCIS asylum officers, U.S. immigration 
judges make the final determination as to whether an asylum-seeker can be 
sent to Guatemala. Asylum-seekers can challenge their removal to Guate-
mala by expressing a fear of being sent there, but in order to succeed they 
must establish that they are more likely than not to face persecution there, 
which is a higher standard than one must meet to receive asylum in the 
U.S. 156 As of March 2020, more than 800 asylum-seekers from Honduras 
and El Salvador had been sent o Guatemala under the Asylum Cooperative 
152. See Susan Fratze, International Experience Suggests Safe Third-Country 
Agreement Would Not Solve the U.S.-Mexico Border Crisis, MIGRATION PoL'Y INST. 
(June 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/safe-third-country-agreement-
would-not-solve-us-mexico-border-crisis; See also Lindsay Harris, Trump's New Asy-
lum Rule Will GuaranteeMore SeparatedFamilies, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 17, 
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/17/trump-administrations-
new-asylum-rule-would-basically-end-asylum-border/; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra 
note 117. 
153. See Fratze, supra note 152; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 117; 
WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, New U.S. Third Country Asylum Rule Infea-
sible, Inhumane, and Illegal, WOLA (2019), https://www.wola.org/2019/07/third-coun-
try-asylum-rule-infeasible-inhumane-and-illegal/. 
154. See Harris, supra note 152. 
155. See Montoya-Galvez, supra note 113. 
156. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a chance of persecution as low as 
ten per cent may be enough to justify a grant of asylum. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 
U.S. 421, 440 (1987). 
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Agreement. 157 Interviews by U.S. officials are reported to last as little as 
five minutes, without a fair opportunity to make one's asylum claim.158 
Two separate lawsuits were filed in response to the Safe Third Country 
policy. This first (EastBay v. Barr)was filed on July 16, 2019.159 It is based 
exclusively on the same two statutes that formed the challenge to the 
Turnback policy: the INA and the APA. In this case, the plaintiffs claim 
that the rule goes beyond two of the carefully delineated exceptions to the 
right to apply for asylum under the INA: when the applicant had been 
firmly resettled in a third country before arriving in the U.S. or when there 
is a bilateral or multilateral agreement allowing the U.S. to return the appli-
cant to a country through which she had traversed on her way to the U.S. 160 
The complaint also alleges that he rule violates the APA because it is not in 
accordance with law, is arbitrary and capricious, and was issued without the 
requisite notice and comment. 161 
The District Court for the Northern District of California granted a 
nationwide injunction against the rule on July 24, 2019. However, on Au-
gust 16, 2019, the Ninth Circuit ordered a stay of that injunction insofar as 
it applies outside the Ninth Circuit.1 6 2 And on September 11, 2019 the Su-
preme Court granted a motion to stay both the district court's July 24, 2019 
order granting the preliminary injunction and the September 9, 2019 order 
restoring the nationwide scope of the injunction pending appeal in the Ninth 
157. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Immigration Officers Say Asylum Deal With Guate-
mala Is Unlawful, THE NEW YORK TIMES (March 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/03/06/us/politics/trump-asylum-guatemala.html; Reynaldo Leanos Jr, Asylum-
Seekers Reaching U.S. Border Are Being Flown To Guatemala,NPR (March 11, 2020 
4:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/11/814602596/asylum-seekers-reaching-u-s-
border-are-being-flown-to-guatemala. 
158. Reynaldo Leafos Jr, Asylum-Seekers Reaching U.S. BorderAre Being Flown 
To Guatemala,NPR (March 11, 2020 4:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/11/8146 
02596/asylum-seekers-reaching-u-s-border-are-being-flown-to-guatemala. Guatemala 
has attempted to block flights coming from the U.S. with asylum-seekers aboard due to 
the Covid-19 outbreak. See Priscilla Alvarez, Trump administrationhas made sweeping 
changes to the US immigration system during the coronavirus pandemic, CBS58 
NEWS (Apr. 21, 2020, 7:39 AM) https://www.cbs58.com/news/trump-administration-
has-made-sweeping-changes-to-the-us-immigration-system-during-the-coronavirus-
pandemic; Izer, Guatemala: at least 50% of American deportees have a coronavirus, 
PRESSSTORIES (April 15, 2020), https://presstories.com/2020/04/15/guatemala-at-
least-50-of-american-deportees-have-a-coronavirus/. 
159. See Complaint, East Bay Covenant Sanctuary, supra note 96. 
160. See id. at 29. 
161. See id. at 30-31. 
162. Order, East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, supra note 96. 
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Circuit and disposition of any writ of certiorari that may be sought. 163 Thus, 
the rule may go forward in other parts of the country, including in Texas 
and New Mexico, where many asylum-seekers from Central America, Mex-
ico and elsewhere cross the border from Mexico.1" 
The second lawsuit challenging the Safe Third Country policy (U.T. v. 
Barr) was filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia in January 
2020.165 It alleges that the Safe Third Country violates a number of statutes, 
including the INA, the APA, and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
turing Act of 1998.166 Most of the allegations center on the policy's lack of 
meaningful inquiry into an applicant's fear of persecution and its violation 
of statutory requirements that receiving nations of any asylum agreement 
must be equipped to provide asylum-seekers full and fair procedures to de-
termine asylum claims. 167 It does not, however, allege that the policy vio-
lates a constitutional right to seek asylum. As of this writing, no courts have 
issued any decisions in this case. 
IV. ANALYSIS - WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEEK 
ASYLUM WOULD MATTER. 
The cases reviewed above, and the political context in which they have 
emerged, demonstrate why a constitutional right to seek asylum under the 
Due Process clause would make a difference. That political context, in 
which the very notion of being able to apply for asylum in the U.S. is under 
serious attack, demonstrates why a constitutional right to seek asylum is 
necessary. The legislative basis for the opportunity to apply for asylum in 
the U.S. ("Any alien. . .may apply for asylum168) is something of a thin reed 
that could be severely limited through future legislative or administrative 
enactments. Indeed, the executive and administrative measures reviewed in 
this article provide a preview of what some of those limitations might look 
163. Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S.Ct. 3, 3 (2019). Justices 
Sotomayor and Ginsberg dissented from the grant of stay, echoing concerns in the Dis-
trict Court opinion, stating lower court decisions should be respected, and explaining a 
stay pending appeal is "extraordinary" relief with an "especially heavy" burden of proof 
for the government. Id. at *3-6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
164. See Norman Merchant, Court Says U.S. Can Reject Asylum Along Parts Of 
Mexico Border, HUFFINGTON POST, August 16, 2019, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
united-states-reject-asylum-mexico-bordern_5d56f9f6e4b056fafd0b9f06. 
165. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.T. v. Barr, (No. 1:20-cv-
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like, depending on the composition of future sessions of Congress. As Ko-
walczyk and Versteeg and Gil-Bazo note, a constitutionalized right to asy-
lum would be better able to withstand such changes in the political branches 
of government. 169 As Coffey put it, "When rights ascend to constitutional 
recognition, they reside in the province of the judiciary and cannot be re-
duced through the discretion of administrative agencies." 170 
The building blocks for such a constitutional right are firmly in place. 
Several Circuit Courts (most emphatically the Fifth, Second, Eleventh and 
DC) recognize it and have reviewed restrictions on it accordingly. Others 
(most notably the Fourth and First) have refused to do so. Still others (in-
cluding the Third and Eighth Circuits) are agnostic. The courts in the first 
group have recognized that Congress' passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 
created a constitutionally protected interest in applying for asylum, restric-
tions on which are subject to due process analysis. They may have been 
motivated, in part, by the judiciary's long-standing skepticism in the way 
that administrative agencies (the former INS and the current DHS) fulfill 
(or fail to fulfill) their responsibility to protect the interests of non-
citizens. 171 
Moreover, the extension of a due process right to seek asylum would 
not place a significant burden on the federal judiciary, which has grown 
comfortable with the relatively uncomplicated due process analysis. As the 
Supreme Court has noted, "We have described 'the root requirement' of the 
Due Process Clause as being 'that an individual be given an opportunity for 
a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.' "172 In-
deed, given the judiciary's skepticism toward the administrative agencies 
charged with enforcement of the nation's immigration laws, many courts 
would welcome the opportunity to extend the analysis to asylum-seekers. A 
resolution of the conflict between Circuits on this issue would provide for a 
uniform means of testing the constitutional legitimacy of any restrictions on 
the right of access to the asylum process. As such, it would lessen the likeli-
hood of controversy over whether an injunction issued by a single district 
court would have nationwide effect. 173 It would also ensure that he rights of 
169. Kowalczyk and Versteeg, supra note 2; Gil-Bazo, supra note 16. 
170. Coffey, supra note 45 at 334 (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 
(1977)). 
171. Id. at 305. 
172. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). 
173. In its February 2020 decision upholding a nationwide injunction against the 
MPP program, The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the controversy over the nationwide 
scope of injunctions issued by district courts. See Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 
1073, 1094 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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asylum-seekers are protected according to the due process mandate of the 
Constitution, regardless of where they might have entered the United States. 
Placing this issue in the international context, constitutionalizing the 
right to seek asylum in the United States would make it among the most 
effective such rights in the world. Only in Mexico and Ecuador has the 
constitutional right to asylum been given any effect in national jurispru-
dence. 17 4 Moreover, given the plethora of legal challenges to the Trump 
Administration's immigration policies, the U.S. would undoubtedly develop 
the world's most robust jurisprudence on the constitutional right to seek 
asylum. Indeed, it would likely become a leader in this area. The right to 
seek asylum in the U.S. would surely not be mere window dressing. It 
would have real power. 
But it would not be unfettered. There are already many "escape 
clauses" which would limit any such constitutionalized right to asylum. For 
one thing, that right - unlike in many countries of the world - would be 
limited to the five grounds for asylum enumerated in the Refugee Conven-
tion. 17 5 It would not widen the scope of asylum protection; it would merely 
provide greater protection against executive or legislative efforts to restrict 
access to it. Moreover, any asylum restriction that arguably arises within the 
removal process would be subject to the jurisdiction-stripping section of the 
INA, which prohibits judicial review of such action until there has been a 
final agency action. 176 This would limit the scope of judicial oversight of 
the due process implications of at least certain agency actions, unless they 
were deemed to have "shocked the conscience". 
The next section of this article analyzes whether a constitutional right 
to seek asylum would likely have made a difference in the adjudication of 
the challenges to the four asylum-restricting policies discussed above. 
Where appropriate, that analysis will be guided by the three factors against 
which procedural due process is measured, according to the decision in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge; i.e., the interest at stake for the individual; the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the 
probable value of additional or different safeguards; and the interest of the 
174. See Meili, supra note 3. 
175. As noted above, those five grounds are race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, and political opinion. In several countries of the world, 
particularly in Latin America and Africa, the constitutional right to asylum has broad-
ened those categories to include flight from armed conflict, massive violations of 
human rights, and serious disruptions to the public order. See, e.g., Constituci6n Politica 
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Constitution of the United Mexican States] (incorpo-
rating the Cartagena Declaration of 1984). See also Meili, supra note 3. 
176. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(9). 
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government in using the current procedures rather than additional or differ-
ent procedures. 177 
V. WOULD A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ASYLUM MAKE A 
DIFFERENCE IN SPECIFIC CASES?. 
A. Zero Tolerance 
In its decision granting a preliminary injunction, the district court in 
Ms. L v. ICE held that the government had violated the plaintiffs' substan-
tive due process right to family integrity. That finding was based on the 
court's conclusion that the family separation policy "shocks the con-
science". It is unlikely that a constitutional right to petition for asylum 
would have made any difference in the outcome of this case, as the plain-
tiffs had achieved their desired result through the substantive due process 
argument. What this case does demonstrate, nevertheless, is that at least 
some courts (here, the Southern District of California) are willing to engage 
in due process challenges on behalf of asylum-seekers, albeit not with re-
spect to a due process right to seek asylum. 
B. Turnback 
The District Court decision in Otro Lado v. Trump represents the most 
full-throated support for the procedural due process rights of asylum-seek-
ers in the cases analyzed in this article. In its July 2019 decision, the Dis-
trict Court rejected the government's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's 
procedural due process claims against he amalgam of policies and practices 
that comprise the Trump Administration's Turnback program. It held that 
those claims derived from the statutory benefit that Congress afforded asy-
lum-seekers as part of the Refugee Act of 1980. This decision demonstrates 
the utility of a due process right to seek asylum. 
C. MigrantProtection Protocols 
A due process right to seek asylum would be of significant assistance 
to the plaintiffs in this case.178 It is readily apparent that forcing applicants 
177. Mathews, supra note 77, at 334-35. 
178. The efficacy of such an argument would depend on creative lawyering to 
evade the "vise-like grip" of INA § 1252 (b)(9), given that this case arises within the 
context of the removal of non-citizens from the United States. Such creativity might 
include the argument that by immediately sending certain asylum-seekers to Mexico 
before any sort of processing of their claims, the policy operates outside the scope of 
the removal process altogether. 
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to remain in Mexico while their claims are pending and where they face 
both danger and deprivation prevents them from adequately exercising their 
right to apply for asylum in the U.S. It also produces logistical hurdles to an 
effective exercise of that right to seek asylum, including limited access to 
counsel, immigration court and other immigration-related agencies, and to 
other resources that would allow them to articulate their claim in an effec-
1tive manner. 7 9 One could persuasively argue that because of these obsta-
cles, the Migrant Protection Protocols "make the exercise of [the right to 
petition for asylum] utterly impossible." 80 
The Mathews v. Eldridge factors suggest that the MPP would not pass 
muster under a constitutional right to seek asylum. As noted above, the 
interest at stake is significant for any asylum-seeker, but it is especially 
weighty in this instance because of the dangerous conditions under which 
asylum-seekers must await their hearing. Moreover, because of the physical 
hazards and procedural flaws of the MPP, the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of the interest at stake is extremely high. As such, the value of additional 
safeguards (such as decent living conditions and greater due process protec-
tions for asylum-seekers in the courts along the border) would be signifi-
cant. On the other hand, the interest of the government in forcing asylum-
seekers to wait in Mexico rather than in the U.S. is not equivalent. The MPP 
- and the legal challenges to it - does not implicate or threaten the sover-
eign authority of the U.S. to determine who may gain entry into the country. 
It is more a matter of administrative convenience and related budgetary 
priorities: forcing asylum-seekers to wait in Mexico means that the U.S. 
will be detaining or otherwise housing fewer asylum-seekers while they 
await their hearing. Such administrative and budgetary concerns would pre-
sumably not measure up to the interests of asylum-seekers in avoiding 
persecution. 
D. Safe Third Country 
This may be the clearest example yet of the need for a due process 
right to seek asylum in the U.S. This policy, which bears a significant like-
ness to Australia's offshore processing of asylum-seekers, makes the exer-
cise of that right "utterly impossible".181 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit 
179. See Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Trump Administration Says "Remain in Mex-
ico" Program Is One "We're Building to Last," CBS NEws, Aug. 19, 2019, https:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/remain-in-mexico-trump-administration- says-controversial-
program-is-one-were-building-to-last/. 
180. HaitianRefugee Ctr., 676 F.2d at 1039. 
181. Id. President Trump has praised Australia's off-shore processing plan as a 
model for effective immigration control. See Luke Henriques-Gomes, Donald Trump 
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limited the injunction against the policy to the geographic limits of the 
Ninth Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently permitted the pol-
icy to go forward pending further litigation below. While these develop-
ments may not signal judicial favoritism toward the policy, they 
demonstrate the weakness of a Circuit-by-Circuit review of national immi-
gration policies. Such a patchwork of decisions would be less likely if there 
were a uniformly recognized (and presumably enforced) Constitutional due 
process right to petition for asylum. In addition, the Safe Third Country 
policy would almost assuredly violate such a constitutional right to seek 
asylum, given that huge numbers of asylum-seekers would be barred from 
asserting an asylum claim in the U.S. before being sent to El Salvador, 
Guatemala or Honduras, among the most dangerous countries in the world. 
As such, the policy poses a significant risk of depriving these asylum-seek-
ers of their significant interest in obtaining protection from persecution. 
And while the U.S. may have an interest in decreasing the number of asy-
lum applications lodged within its borders, that interest -like the govern-
mental interest underpinning the MPP - is largely administrative and 
budgetary. Accordingly, a court would likely deem it secondary to the 
weightier interests of individual asylum-seekers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitutional right to seek asylum in the United States has been 
in a holding pattern for several decades. The Circuit split on the issue has 
forced refugee advocates to keep the argument in reserve, relying instead on 
the more cramped, statutorily-based "opportunity" to apply for asylum 
under the INA, as well as administrative irregularities under the APA. 
These arguments have had limited success in the litigation challenging the 
Trump Administration's unprecedented assault on access to the asylum sys-
tem in the U.S. 
Supreme Court approval of a procedural due process right to petition 
for asylum would provide a clearer and more robust basis for confronting 
these policies. It is a logical extension of the well-established due process 
rights of non-citizens generally. And from a global perspective, it would 
allow the U.S. to play a leading role at a time when the constitutional right 
to asylum in other countries is slowly emerging as an important part of the 
refugee advocate's toolkit. Such a constitutional right would be far more 
than mere window dressing, which is its fate in most countries. In the U.S., 
Says 'Much Can Be Learned' from Australia's Hardline Asylum Seeker Policies, 
GUARDIAN, June 26, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jun/27/donald-
trump-says-much-can-be-learned-from-australias-hardline-asylum-seeker-policies. 
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it would provide asylum-seekers and their lawyers with a meaningful basis 
for guaranteeing unfettered access to asylum. In the current global environ-
ment, where increasingly draconian limitations on such access have become 
the norm, such guarantees are more crucial than ever. 
